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NPRR564
Summary
Title | Thirty-Minute Emergency Response Service (ERS) and Other ERS Revisions |
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Next Group | |
Next Step | |
Status | Approved on 11/19/2013 |
Effective Dates |
02/01/2014
All sections except for Section 3.14.3.4(3) 10/16/2014
Section 3.14.3.4(3) |
Action
Date | Gov Body | Action Taken | Next Steps |
---|---|---|---|
11/19/2013 | BOARD | Approved | |
11/07/2013 | TAC | Recommended for Approval | ERCOT Board consideration of NPRR564 |
10/17/2013 | PRS | Recommended for Approval | TAC consideration of NPRR564 |
09/19/2013 | PRS | Deferred/Tabled | PRS consideration of NPRR564 |
Voting Record
Date | Gov Body | Motion | Result |
---|---|---|---|
11/19/2013 | BOARD | To approve NPRR564 as recommended by TAC in the 11/7/13 TAC Report. | Passed |
11/07/2013 | TAC | To recommend approval of NPRR564 as recommended by PRS in the 10/17/13 PRS Report with a proposed effective date of February 1 2014, to recommend approval of the "Emergency Response Service Procurement Methodology" as revised by TAC with a proposed effective date of upon ERCOT Board approval, and to add the methodology to the Other Binding Document List. | Passed |
10/17/2013 | PRS | To recommend approval of NPRR564 as amended by the 9/10/13 ERCOT comments and as revised by PRS with a recommended priority of 2013 and rank of 892. | Passed |
09/19/2013 | PRS | To grant NPRR564 Urgent status and to table NPRR564 for one month. | Passed |
Background
Status: | Approved |
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Date Posted: | Aug 21, 2013 |
Sponsor: | ERCOT |
Urgent: | Yes |
Sections: | 2.1, 3.14.3, 3.14.3.1, 3.14.3.2, 3.14.3.3, 3.14.3.4, 6.5.9.4.2, 6.6.11.1, 6.6.11.2, 8.1.3.1.1, 8.1.3.1.2, 8.1.3.1.3, 8.1.3.1.3.1, 8.1.3.1.3.2, 8.1.3.1.3.3, 8.1.3.1.4, 8.1.3.2, 8.1.3.3, 8.1.3.3.1, 8.1.3.4, 8.4, 9.14.5 |
Description: | This Nodal Protocol Revision Request (NPRR) proposes a 30-minute Emergency Response Service (ERS) product and recommends other changes to ERS more generally, including the following: 1. Introduces Settlement based on a clearing price instead of individual Qualified Scheduling Entity (QSE) offer price. 2. Introduces stronger financial penalties for non-performance in a single ERS Standard Contract Term but removes mandatory suspensions. 3. Clarifies obligations of ERS Resources when deployments cross over multiple ERS Time Periods. 4. Authorizes ERCOT to provide times and dates of particular Resource deployments to QSEs in order to allow them to analyze past performance of newly acquired ERS sites. 5. Prohibits participation by sites associated with Dynamically Scheduled Resources (DSRs). 6. Clarifies that ERS Generators and ERS Loads are to be evaluated together when an ERS Generator is providing backup to an ERS Load. |
Reason: | ERCOT is proposing an ERS product with a thirty-minute ramp rate (ERS-30) in order to secure additional Demand Response capability and further strengthen reliability in the ERCOT Region. Since July 15, 2012, ERCOT has been conducting a pilot project to assess the operational benefits of an ERS-30 product. Based on the results of the pilot observed to date, ERCOT has concluded that such a product would bring additional participation from Loads that cannot meet a ten-minute ramp requirement, thereby providing additional reliability benefits. While a longer ramp means the product is less responsive than the existing ten-minute ERS product (ERS-10), being able to deploy it earlier during an Energy Emergency Alert gives ERCOT an additional reliability tool that should be especially valuable during foreseeable peak conditions, such as summer afternoons. This NPRR also proposes to introduce a clearing price (with some differences from NPRR537, ERS Clearing Price) in lieu of as-bid pricing, which should discourage inefficient price-chasing. Additionally, proposed changes to the maximum deployment duration language (similar to that proposed in NPRR536, ERS Time Obligation Certainty) should ensure that this deployment cap is applied to individual ERS Resources so as to maximize the operational benefit of the service. This NPRR also proposes that individual Resources will be subject to payment reductions that vary exponentially with the degree of individual performance failure in the event of a QSE-level failure, instead of being automatically suspended. |